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1. INTRODUCTION 
My vox-pol fellowship in 2015–2016 coincided with two 
important developments in Europe. The first was the eruption 
of social media hate speech that followed hundreds of thousands 
of refugees arriving from war-ravaged Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
The second was the growing buoyancy of the extreme right online, 
who tried to capitalise on this anger to increase its political power 
and recruit followers.
I had just finished a research project in Ethiopia, a country 
with a long history of civil war and conflict. It was a sobering expe-
rience to return to Europe to discover how the social media debates 
on the refugee crisis had become more aggressive and vitriolic 
than anything I had experienced before as a comparative digital 
media researcher. A cursory look, for instance, at Facebook pages 
in Finland (a country that is more commonly known for its peaceful 
politics, consensus, and social stability) would reveal thousands 
of comments using the most graphic and violent language possible, 
such as “Those rats should be exterminated from the world,” and 
“Why don’t we shoot the invaders into a hole and burn them with 
gasoline to warm our feet?”
All the hallmarks of ostensibly the worst kind of ‘hate speech’ 
were present: attacking people based on their group identity; dehu-
manising them by comparing them to animals; and incitement to 
violence. Moreover, such comments were posted by individuals using 
their public profiles, visible for anybody to see.
So if social media conversations in what has been called the 
safest country in the world had become more violent than those 
I had observed in a country with an ongoing violent ethnic and politi-
cal conflict, what was going on in these popular social media forums? 
Research into the socio-psychological dynamics of violent conflict 
has shown that an increasingly aggressive and polarised style of 
communication can be one of the telltale signs of escalating conflict 
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(Hamelink 2011; Buyse 2014). Were these hateful comments possibly 
a symptom of some underlying social and political tension simmering 
under the glittering surface of social media screens waiting to erupt 
into real-world violence? How dangerous were they?
As my research progressed, it also became increasingly clear that 
this growing visibility of social media hate speech was also somehow 
related to the resurgent confidence of the extreme right online. 
A new style of online political tactics had emerged, the significance 
of which researchers and policymakers were struggling to under-
stand: ecosystems of fake news; bots manipulating social media 
popularity rankings; and disinformation campaigns orchestrated 
on social media forums (Benkler et al. 2017; Marwick and Lewis 2017; 
Wardle and Derakhshan 2017). What was the relationship between 
these activities by the extreme right online and the emergence 
of social media vitriol that targeted refugees and the people who 
supported them? How successful were these groups in exploiting the 
affordances of social media platforms such as Facebook to advance 
their political goals?
A few years later, these questions remain as crucial as ever. 
Social media debates in Europe and the United States are as toxic 
as ever. The concerns about the political fallout of extreme right 
disinformation have become mainstream. Signs of these develop-
ments were visible in my research. This report outlines its findings.
1.1 EXISTING LITERATURE
Research on violent online political extremism has convention-
ally focused on the online activities of violent extremist and 
terrorist groups (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai 2017). This 
has presupposed a relatively easy-to-define normative division 
between legitimate forms of political expression and illegitimate 
forms of political expression such as incitement to terrorist 
violence. This normative division, however, becomes difficult 
to ascertain when the question is of online hate speech. Brown 
and Cowls (2015, p. 29) write, “Beyond the categories of speech 
already described, which many states have proscribed by law, 
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there is less consensus on what constitutes online ‘extremist’ mate-
rial that should be policed – especially where it does not directly 
encourage violence.”
Gagliardone et al. (2015a, p. 10) define online hate speech as 
“expressions that advocate incitement to harm (particularly, discrimi-
nation, hostility and violence) based upon the target’s being identified 
with a certain social or demographic group.” This definition is also 
often expanded to include expressions that more generally “foster 
a climate of prejudice and intolerance on the assumption that this 
may fuel targeted discrimination, hostility and violent attacks” (ibid). 
The vast literature on online hate speech thus broadly agrees on two 
characteristics: hate speech dehumanises its victims according to 
their group identity, but it also amplifies the group identity of the 
perpetrator by attempting to create an antagonistic relationship 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see Gelber 2011; Heinze 2017; see also Butler 
1997). Waldron (2012, p. 4), for instance, writes that hate speech 
creates “something like an environmental threat to social peace, a sort 
of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word, 
so that eventually it becomes harder and less natural for even the 
good-hearted members of the society to play their part in maintaining 
this public good.”
Unlike more clear-cut cases of violent extremist activity, however, 
such indirect effects of hate speech are difficult to pin down analyti-
cally or prosecute legally. Outside clear-cut examples of incitements 
to violence, there is thus no consensus on exactly what kinds of 
speech acts should fall outside the purview of legitimate forms of 
political expression. Bartlett et al. (2014, p. 11) write “how to define the 
limits of free speech is a central debate in most modern democracies. 
This is particularly true in respect of speech that might be deemed 
hateful, abusive, or racist. Defining and legislating against this type 
of speech is extremely difficult, and has spawned a large philosophi-
cal, linguistic, theoretical, and legal literature.”
Different historical traditions also inform where this normative 
line between legitimate and illegitimate forms of political expression 
are drawn. The United States and Europe, for instance, entertain 
different notions about where this boundary of acceptable forms 
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of expression lies, with the United States circumscribing stricter 
protection for freedom of speech (see Post 2009; Brown 2015). 
Moreover, once we move away from the relatively sheltered purview 
of Western liberal democracies, debates on hate speech have also 
been widely misused for political purposes (see Price and Stremlau 
2017). Gagliardone et al. (2015a, p. 10) write, “accusations of foment-
ing hate speech may be traded among political opponents or used by 
those in power to curb dissent and criticism.” The freedom of speech 
organisation Article 19 (2015, p. 16) similarly cautions against “too 
readily identifying expressions as ‘hate speech’ … as its use can also 
have negative consequences … and can be abused to justify inappro-
priate restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, in particular 
in cases of marginalised and vulnerable communities.”
Given these controversies around defining what hate speech 
is – and especially what should be done about it – this report 
instead uses the term ‘aggressive or hateful speech’ when referring 
to instances of online vitriol, aggression, and hate that are broadly 
targeted at refugees and immigrants. Where possible, I avoid the more 
commonly used term ‘hate speech’. I do this for two reasons. Firstly, 
using this term allows me to approach the communicative dynamics 
of social media conversations without having to first ascribe nor-
mative value to them. As I have argued elsewhere, global debates 
on hate speech have become overdetermined insofar as there are 
more theories in circulation than empirical evidence would perhaps 
warrant (see Pohjonen and Ahmed 2016). Recoiling from these 
legal–normative debates around hate speech, even if temporarily, 
helps to step back from the controversies and focus more on “the 
situatedness of online speech forms in different cultural and political 
milieus” (Pohjonen and Udupa 2017, p. 1174) – the complex commu-
nicative relationships and media-related practices that inform such 
speech acts online. Secondly, using a broader term such as aggressive 
or hateful speech also allows me to explore large-scale social media 
conversations without being bogged down with the methodolog-
ical problems involved in accurately classifying what hate speech 
is, at least in the stricter legal sense of the term (Davidson et al. 
2017; see also Saleem et al. 2017). Davison et al. (2017, p. 4) warn 
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that “if we conflate hate speech and offensive language then we 
erroneously consider many people to be hate speakers … and fail 
[to] differentiate between commonplace offensive language and 
serious hate speech … Given the legal and moral implications of 
hate speech it is important that we are able to accurately distinguish 
between the two.” Employing a category whose boundaries are 
less rigorously defined thus allows the research to shift focus away 
from trying to define what hate speech is and focus instead on the 
broader communicative dynamics and communicative relationships 
behind it. Hopefully, this subtle, yet important, difference becomes 
clear in the report.
1.2 A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO HATE SPEECH
Underpinning the research is a tension between two academic 
traditions. The first is the growing body of research on violent online 
political extremism. The second is approaches in peace and conflict 
studies that have analysed the role the media has played in situations 
of violent ethnic, political, or social conflict. Jackson (2012) argues 
that these two traditions have developed, surprisingly, in isolation 
from each other despite sharing similar concerns about the role the 
media have in catalysing offline violence (see also Conway 2017). 
This disconnect between them is all the more surprising because 
some of the most striking examples where the media have been 
linked to widespread violence do not come from the terrorist attacks 
in Brussels, London, Nice, or Paris. These events, however horrific, 
are still dwarfed in comparison to the use of community radio in 
Rwanda to incite genocide (where more than a million people were 
killed), the use of Twitter in Kenya during the 2007 presidential 
elections to stir up ethnic hatred (where more than a thousand 
people were killed), or the recent use of Facebook to incite violence 
against the Rohingyas in Myanmar (where thousands have allegedly 
been killed).
The framework used in this research builds on two previous 
research projects that explored online hate speech and conflict 
from such a comparative perspective. The first was a pilot project 
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that mapped out, for the first time ever, online hate speech in Ethiopia 
(see Gagliardone, Pohjonen, and Patel 2014). The pilot explored 
the ‘dangerous speech’ framework, developed initially by Benesch 
(2012, 2014) and applied by the Umati project (2012-2013) to explore 
instances of online hatred during the 2014 presidential elections in 
Kenya. Benesch argues that hate speech is too broad as a conceptual 
category for identifying those kinds of speech acts that could act 
as early warning signs for offline violence. She writes, “First, hate 
speech is common in many societies, unfortunately, including those 
at minimal risk of genocide. Second, some hate speech does not 
appreciably increase the risk of mass violence, although it may cause 
serious emotional and psychological damage” (2012, p.1). Moreover, 
she proposes that five additional criteria are needed when assessing 
how dangerous speech acts are (2012, p. 2):
1. A powerful speaker with a high degree of influence over 
the audience;
2. The audience has grievances and fear that the speaker 
can cultivate;
3. A speech act that is clearly understood as a call to violence;
4. A social or historical context that is propitious for violence, 
for any of a variety of reasons, including longstanding 
competition between groups for resources, lack of efforts 
to solve grievances, or previous episodes of violence; and
5. A means of dissemination that is influential in itself, for 
example because it is the sole or primary source of news 
for the relevant audience.
Our pilot research found that there were indeed abundant 
examples of such aggressive or hateful speech in Ethiopian online 
spaces. However, the pilot project also quickly realised that focusing 
methodologically on the formal content of social media speech acts 
alone was not enough to assess its risks: this was neither represent-
ative of the dynamics of social media conversations nor indicative 
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of how dangerous such statements were in catalysing offline violence. 
As Benesch (2013, 2014), and Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016) 
stress, a formal analysis of extreme content needs to be augmented 
with a more contextual understanding of the speakers and audiences, 
socio-historical context, and media channels used to disseminate 
it. Conversely, in polarised political situations, focusing only on 
controversial content without first contextualising it can further risk 
exacerbating political tensions and give justification to governments 
to implement measures of censorship that might not be commensura-
ble with its actual dangers.
Our follow-up project in Ethiopia tried to address this concern. 
Instead of focusing only on the formal content of speech acts, it 
decided to map out the broader communicative dynamics behind 
such hateful speech online. To do this, it developed a conceptual 
framework that categorised online discussions based on whether 
they facilitated or hindered a communicative relationship between 
interlocutors involved in online or social media conversations. 
Conversations classified as ‘going against’ consisted of statements 
that represented conflict-maintaining behaviour or advocated hatred, 
incitement or discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, gender, 
sexual identity or political affiliation. In turn, the types of conversa-
tion that we classified as ‘going towards’ consisted of statements that 
helped to maintain a communicative relationship by acknowledging 
the other person’s or group’s position and by creating engagement 
with other members in the conversation even if the tone was critical 
(see Gagliardone et al. 2016).
This conceptual move helped us to provide a different perspec-
tive to the underlying communicative dynamics and relationships 
behind hateful social media conversations. What was surprising 
about approaching the object of study from this perspective was 
that social media conversations in Ethiopia seemed to favour positive 
engagement over more aggressive or hateful forms of communica-
tion. In other words, by contextualising these conversations into 
the broader media environment and communicative relationships 
in which they were embedded, these conversations did not reflect 
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the ethnic and political polarisation in the country as much as much 
as we had anticipated. Instead, they showed promise as a means to 
mitigate some of the existing tensions by creating spaces of engage-
ment where ideologically opposed participants could communicate 
and engage with each other (see Gagliardone et al. 2015b, 2016).
These findings are idiosyncratic to the Ethiopian media envi-
ronment (see Human Rights Watch 2015, 2016) and they cannot, 
of course, be applied to other countries without first taking into 
account the different socio-historical contexts and media environ-
ments in these countries. Nonetheless, our research in Ethiopia 
helped us to extrapolate three suggestions for analysis of online 
and social media hate speech from such a comparative perspective:
1. Hate speech should not be seen as a universal category but rather 
as a situated practice that always exists in specific cultural and 
political contexts and media environments;
2. Focusing only on the content of hate speech acts risks sensation-
alising online and social media conversations in polarised political 
environments and situations of conflict; and
3. The risks of hate speech cannot be thus understood by focusing 
only on the content of hateful speech acts. The broader commu-
nicative dynamics and relationships behind hateful speech acts 
also need to be carefully considered.
My VOX-Pol research emerged out of an effort to further develop 
this kind of critical-comparative research for understanding social 
media hate speech. On a more conceptual level, I wanted to explore 
what types of insight such a comparative perspective would engender 
when used in the European context. Could some of the approaches 
that were developed to understand media and conflict in countries 
such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda also help us to better under-
stand what was going on on European social media during the refugee 
crisis? What kinds of methods of analysis would help us to research 
these questions empirically?
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2. RESEARCH 
DESIGN
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2.1 CASE STUDY
The so-called refugee crisis refers to a period that began in 
early 2015 when hundreds of thousands of refugees started arriving 
in Europe. Around 30,000 arrived in Finland – a nearly ten-fold 
increase from previous years. This arrival of thousands of people 
to this relatively homogeneous country led to a heated debate about 
how they should be received. Rumours about crimes and especially 
rapes committed by refugees were rife on social media. Soldiers of 
Odin, an extreme right vigilante group, gained notoriety by patrolling 
the streets in its self-proclaimed mission to protect vulnerable women 
from the refugees.1
Finnish Broadcasting Company (Yle) article on anti-refugee/immigration
protest and its counter-protest2
1 See independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/soldiers-of-odin-the-far-right-
groups-in-finland-protecting-women-from-asylum-seekers-a6846341.html.
2 See https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/helsinki_police_brace_for_anti-
immigration_and_anti-racism_demos/8632946.
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This polarisation was also reflected in social media. The Rajat 
Kiinni (Close the Borders) Facebook group became a favourite hotbed 
for anti-refugee/anti-immigration sentiment. In turn, the Facebook 
group the Rasmus (Finland’s national network and association 
working against racism and xenophobia, and promoting equity and 
human rights) became a popular forum for anti-racist opinions. The 
two groups routinely engaged each other in online flame wars as well 
as demonstrations and counter-demonstrations against each other.
The social polarisation that heightened during the refugee crisis 
was of course not unique to Finland. However, what was perhaps 
unique about Finland’s social media environment was that, when the 
toxicity of conversations was at its apex at the beginning of 2016, mem-
bers of these two antagonistic Facebook groups also launched a new 
group with the explicit purpose of creating a ‘civilised conversation’ 
about refugees/immigration. This third group, Asiallista Keskustelua 
Maahanmuutosta (a civilised conversation about immigration), estab-
lished a strict set of guidelines on what type of speech was tolerated 
in order to facilitate a less toxic online culture (see Section 3.4).
These three social media communities in Finland thus provided 
my research with a unique case study to empirically analyse the 
communicative dynamics and relationships behind hateful online 
and social media conversations during the refugee crisis. The three 
groups included: a popular anti-refugee/anti-immigration group crit-
icised for hate speech and its links to the extreme right; an anti-racist 
group that opposed it; and a group launched in-between as a kind 
of ‘organic’ counter-speech aimed at mitigating the toxicity of social 
media debates (see Bartlett and Krasodomski-Jones 2015; Ferguson 
2016). The groups were also public and highly active. In 2016 alone, 
these groups published close to 100,000 posts and 500,000 com-
ments. The large-scale nature of these public conversations allowed 
the research to explore methods usually reserved for ‘big data’ 
approaches. This allowed me to examine, in particular, three sets 
of research questions:
• RQ1: How prevalent was such aggressive or hateful commu-
nication in these three distinctly different types of Facebook 
15 HORIZONS OF HATE
group? Where, and under what circumstances, was it prevalent? 
What kinds of communicative dynamics and relationships 
informed them?
• RQ2: How did the external information shared in these groups 
relate to the prevalence of aggressive or hateful communication? 
What was the relationship between extreme right news sources 
and disinformation online and the prevalence of such a style 
of communication?
• RQ3: Was there something distinct about the communicative 
dynamics of the Facebook group that was set up to mitigate 
toxic social media conversations around refugees/immigration? 
Was this group successful in fostering engagement and debate?
2.2 DATA COLLECTION AND PREPROCESSING
In order to explore these questions, all public data from the three 
groups was downloaded using the Facebook application programming 
interface (API).3 The dataset was then enriched to add gender, the 
type of information source shared (root URL), and whether the posts 
and comments contained hateful speech.4 Figure 1 shows the work-
flow used for data retrieval, preprocessing and exploration/analysis.
3 I used the Rfacebook package for this purpose. See https://github.com/
pablobarbera/Rfacebook. 
4 Firstly, the gender of all the users posting and commenting was identified 
by cross-referencing the names of the users with a list of all male and 
female names in Finland. This allowed the gender of the speaker to be 
identified 90–95% of the time. Secondly, the root domain of all the 
URLs was parsed and then manually labelled. Six categories were used to 
differentiate the types of news sources shared: (1) news (mainstream); (2) 
alternative (extreme right); (3) tabloids; (4) entertainment; (5) blog; and (6) 
social media. The urltools package in R was used to parse the URLs. See 
https://github.com/Ironholds/urltools. Finally, all the textual content from 
the posts and comments were morphologically stemmed and lemmatised 
to facilitate text mining. We used OMORFI, the open-source morphology 
package for the Finnish language. See https://github.com/flammie/omorfi.
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Figure 1. Data collection, preprocessing, and analysis workflow
2.3 METHODS AND EXPERIMENTS
2.3.1 Classification of Aggressive, Offensive and Hateful Speech
One of the biggest challenges in researching social media hate speech 
is accurately classifying statements that contain aggressive, vitriolic, 
offensive, or hateful content. The difficulty is both conceptual and 
methodological. First of all, it is difficult to differentiate what con-
stitutes hate speech conceptually and to determine when it differs 
from offensive language (Davidson et al. 2017, p. 1). Even with human 
annotators, it takes a lot of effort to reach coder agreement, especially 
when working with the stricter legal definition of the term (see Ross 
et al. 2016). These challenges are compounded when the research 
uses computational methods on large datasets. The prevalence of 
offensive keywords can cause algorithms to misclassify statements 
as hate speech when they should be seen merely as instances of 
aggressive or hateful communication. Not all hateful speech contains 
easily identifiable linguistic markers or features that could help to 
identify it. Instead, the everyday use of language continually changes 
and is made up of nuanced linguistic forms such as jokes, innuendo, 
DATA PREPROCESSING METHODS AND
EXPERIMENTS
Links
Posts
Comments
Text
lemmatisation
Social network
analysis
Facebook
Graph API Classification
Topic modelling
Word embedding
Users Gender
URL type
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irony, metaphors, and double meanings that obstinately challenge 
capture by computational methods (Kwok and Wang 2013; see also 
Burnap and Williams 2015).
Aware of the methodological challenges involved in identifying 
speech that could be labelled ‘hate speech’ for analysis, the research 
focused instead on a category of statements that were more broadly 
indexical of sentiments of aggression or hate found in Facebook 
posts and comments. Two machine learning approaches were 
experimented with to detect such statements. The first explored 
supervised machine learning classification where a subset of data 
was labelled to aid the classification of such statements. To do this, 
I manually labelled 3,000 comments that were randomly selected. 
From these statements, I identified the types of posts and comments 
that I was interested in observing in the research. This was done, in 
particular, by focusing on ‘loaded’ words, curse words, and exple-
tives that expressed aggression or hate. I then divided the labelled 
statements into a training and test set (60/40) and used ensemble 
learning of eight different machine learning classifiers to explore dif-
ferent approaches. The most accurate results were achieved with the 
classification and regression tree algorithm (with an F-score of 0.87).5 
The second approach experimented with unsupervised machine 
learning approaches called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) where 
topic clusters that contain words commonly associated with such 
5 I used the the RTextTools package in R for this purpose. See https://
journal.r-project.org/archive/2013-1/collingwood-jurka-boydstun-etal.pdf.
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hateful speech were identified.6 Figure 2 shows the triangulation 
between these two methods used.
Figure 2. Triangulation of supervised and unsupervised
machine learning methods for detecting hateful speech7
However, given the exploratory and more qualitative nature 
of the research (and the lack of resources), I did not carry out 
intercoder reliability tests with multiple coders on the dataset, but 
instead checked the results through extensive random checks to 
6 For the unsupervised topic modelling, I used the text2vec package in 
R. I first experimented with a variety of hyperparameters, and number 
of topics. I ended up using ten topics (document topic prior = 0.5; 
topic_word_prior = 0.01). I then labelled these topics for the posts and 
comments based on what I interpreted to be the most relevant topic 
based on the top 50 words. I finally classified all the posts and comments 
based on what was given as most probable topic for each post and 
comment. The topics that were identified in the comments through the 
method were: (1) cost; (2) debate/racism/speech; (3) English/other; (4) 
migration/culture; (5) government/politics; (6) news/media; (7) offensive/
hate; (8) police/terrorism/border; (9) religion/Islam; and (10) work/
welfare. With the exception of offensive/hate, the topics were used for 
data exploration purposes only.
7 The labelling was done on the original content of the posts and comments.
Translations in Figure 2, however, are based on the lemmatised versions 
of these posts and comments to illustrate the similarities between 
the different types of words used in the supervised and unsupervised 
machine learning approaches.
TOPIC WORDS CATEGORYTEXT LABEL
religion, islam, muslim,
jew, christian,
god, koran
Nigger shit get what
they deserve. Always lie
every topic. Lucky to be.
hate religion/islam
fuck, pig, nigger,
satan, shit,
dammit, dog
offensive/hate
Barbarian take mother
and go home when it
is difficult ... so I do
other
hate
What fucking 
barbarian.Idiot nigger. 
Spoiled shitpants.
racism, racist,
discussion, group
hate speech, opinion
debate/racism
CLASSIFICATION TOPIC MODELLING (LDA)
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see how relevant the labels were for the analysis in question. Both 
the supervised classification and unsupervised topic modelling 
approaches were used thus in a narrower methodological sense to 
augment the primary qualitative research approach. The supervised 
and unsupervised machine learning methods should be considered 
more of an exploratory research heuristic that was used to provide 
insights into the communicative dynamics of these groups together 
with the primary digital ethnographic method used by the research.
What types of comment were then detected by this triangulation 
of approaches? The statements classified as aggressive or hateful 
included a wide range of posts and comments explicitly targeted 
at immigrants/refugees and people who supported them. It is also 
important to note that due to the comments that were identified as 
aggressive or hateful, because of a method that emphasised the use 
of curse words and offensive keywords, a broader range of statements 
that were aggressive or hateful but that did not target anyone in 
particular was also detected. This more general category of state-
ments, however, was necessary for the analysis as the focus was to 
gain a broader understanding of the communicative dynamics behind 
such conversation during the refugee crisis, and thus not limit itself 
only to speech acts that fit under stricter definitions of hate speech.
2.3.2 Word Associations
The research also compared word associations of key terms relating 
to debates around the refugees. This was done by experimenting with 
a set of deep learning methods called word embedding, which map 
a vocabulary of words onto a vector of numbers to create representa-
tions of the words based on the context in which they occur in the 
text, and the proximity to other words. Such word embeddings are 
especially interesting for exploratory research purposes because 
they have been shown to detect implicit biases in the use of language 
from large textual datasets. Foulds (2018, p. 2) writes that “word 
embeddings can encode implicit sexist assumptions,” such as the 
analogy ‘man is to computer programmer as woman is to homemaker’ 
(see also Bolukbasi et al. 2016). To explore such associations found 
within the three different types of group – and especially differences/
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biases in the language used – the research thus explored words that 
were closely associated with terms related to the refugee crisis. The 
following ‘seed’ terms were selected for the association analysis:
• Islam – Islam;
• Muslim – Muslim;
• Maahanmuuttaja – immigrant;
• Matu – a derogatory term for immigrant;
• Neekeri – nigger;
• Pakolainen – refugee;
• Rasisti – racist;
• Suvaitsevainen – somebody who is tolerant or liberal;
• Suvakki – a derogatory term for somebody who is tolerant 
or liberal;
• Terroristi – terrorist;
• Vihapuhe – hate speech;
• MV – reference to the popular extreme right online news 
site MV-lehti;
• Yle – reference to the mainstream public news channel; and
• Rasmus – reference to the anti-racist group.
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Figure 3 shows a network representation of some of the explora-
tory word association network mappings carried out to understand 
relationships between concepts in the three different ideologically 
positioned Facebook groups.
Figure 3. A network representation of word embedding based
on the cosine similarity of key words related to the refugee crisis
2.3.3 Social Network Analysis
The research also used social network analysis to identify what kinds 
of social networks and communities were behind these three groups, 
and how these changed over time. This was done by modelling the 
conversations into two different types of network. The first network 
consisted of the relationship between the external news source (URL), 
and the people who posted and shared this URL. The second network 
comprised the relationship between people who posted and people 
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who commented on these posts. The open-source software Gephi was 
used for network visualisation and exploration. The software ORA 
was used, where necessary, for statistical analysis and dynamic social 
network analysis.
2.3.4 Caveats
There were also a number of caveats about the data collection process 
and methods. Firstly, while these three groups were highly visible 
in the social media debates during the refugee crisis, they should 
not be considered a representative sample of the population or 
social media conversations in general. Rather, these groups provided 
a non-probability sample that was purposely selected based on the 
identity of these groups, and their suitability for the research ques-
tions. Secondly, the collection of data relied on the Facebook API. 
This is contingent on the privacy settings of Facebook. While in most 
cases this does not pose a problem as the groups in question were 
public, it is nonetheless impossible to verify what proportion of the 
original conversations were included in the final dataset. Posts and 
comments are, for instance, sometimes erased after being published; 
these are not available in the final dataset.
2.4 RESEARCH WORKFLOW
The research used a mixed-method approach combining digital 
ethnography with data exploration (see Pohjonen 2018; see also 
Laaksonen et al. 2017). The workflow for analysis consisted of 
four steps:
1. Longitudinal observation of the three groups over a period 
of nine months was used to identify what the key themes and 
topics of interest were, and how these changed over time;
2. Based on this ethnographic engagement, computational text 
mining was used to identify posts and comments in which 
aggressive or hateful speech was found, as well as the associa-
tions between selected keywords;
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3. Social networks analysis was used to identify communities 
in these groups, how they related to each other, and how they 
changed over time. This was further extended by overlaying 
attribute data over the network to visually explore how different 
types of conversation (such as whether it contained aggressive 
or hateful speech) or the gender of the speaker related to the 
social networks and communities; and
4. This data exploration was repeated iteratively until empirically 
grounded arguments could be formed. The approach of com-
bining qualitative and quantitative insights thus provided both 
a granular perspective to the conversations as well as helping 
to identify patterns and trends at a scale usually unavailable 
for qualitative methods.
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3. RESULTS
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3.1 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS
The final dataset consisted of public data from the three 
Facebook groups which was published between 1 January and 
1 September 2016. The three groups were most active during the 
first half of 2016 when the debate over refugees was at its most 
heated in Finland. Table 1 shows that the majority of the members 
in the Rajat Kiinni group and the Asiallista Keskustelua group were 
men. The division between men and women was more evenly divided 
in the Rasmus group: a small majority of members posting were 
men, and a slight majority commenting were female. The Asiallista 
Keskustelua group had the highest average number of comments per 
post, in accordance with it being a group that was set up as a space for 
conversation. This was also reflected in it having the longest average 
word count. All the groups shared external news sources, with about 
half the posts containing links to external URLs.
Table 1. Overall description of the dataset
RAJAT KIINNI ASIALLISTA 
KESKUSTELUA
RASMUS
Members8 12,443 1,259 13,787
Number of posts 54,474 1,101 8,308
Number of comments 355,293 16,245 76,010
Unique individuals Posts: 3,416
Comments: 
7,317
Posts: 262
Comments: 
642
Posts: 2,263
Comments: 
6,106
Gender – posts Male: 63%
Female: 37%
Male: 62%
Female: 38%
Male: 54%
Female: 46%
8 The number of members are from when the data was downloaded in 
September 2016, and may have changed significantly since. The Rajat 
Kiinni group has since been shut down by Facebook.
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RAJAT KIINNI ASIALLISTA 
KESKUSTELUA
RASMUS
Gender – comments Male: 66%
Female: 34%
Male: 54%
Female: 46%
Male: 46%
Female: 54%
Unique URLs shared 2,700 183 2,273
Percentage of posts 
containing a URL
50% 53% 59%
Mean likes 26.8 5.5 31.6
Mean comments 8.3 15.1 8.4
Mean shares 1.8 0 0.4
Mean number of words 
per post
15.2 34.3 20.3
Mean number of words 
per comment
13.1 29.1 24.8
A network visualisation of the dataset in Figure 4 also 
illustrates how polarised the conversations were: the anti-refugee/
anti-immigration (large cluster on the left) and anti-racist 
groups (cluster on the right) contained only a few individuals 
who participated in both groups. These separate clusters were 
bridged by the new discussion group (people who participated 
in the discussion group coloured in black).
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Figure 4. The relationship between people who posted and who commented
in the three groups during the month of February 2016 (with isolates and
pendants removed)
3.2 THE COMMUNICATIVE DYNAMICS 
OF HATEFUL SPEECH
How prevalent were such aggressive or hateful conversations in 
these three ideologically different groups? As Table 2 shows, the 
Rajat Kiinni group contained most of the comments identified 
as aggressive or hateful speech. The supervised classification 
method detected 34,501 aggressive or hateful comments (10%). 
The LDA topic modelling method, in turn, identified 75,840 
(21%) aggressive or hateful comments.9
9 The discrepancies between the two methods experimented with in 
the research can be explained by the use of offensive ‘feature words’ 
(known offensive and derogatory terms, and curse words) in the 
supervised classification process. The statements classified as hateful 
by the LDA method, in turn, identified a broader range of statements 
that were less tied to these specific offensive keywords, derogatory terms 
and curse words. Random checks were performed on all the datasets to 
doublecheck the utility of these classifications to augment the digital 
ethnographic methods used. In most of the quantitative analysis, the 
more restrictive machine learning classification method was used, 
and the topic modelling method was used to verify the results.
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Table 2. The overall distribution of the prevalence of aggressive
or hateful comments detected by the two methods used
SUPERVISED CLASSIFIER RAJAT KIINNI ASIALLISTA 
KESKUSTELUA
RASMUS
Percentage of aggressive  
or hateful comments
10% 2% 1%
Percentage of which  
are male
77% 37% 41%
Percentage of which  
are female
23% 63% 59%
TOPIC MODELLING (LDA) RAJAT KIINNI ASIALLISTA 
KESKUSTELUA
RASMUS
Percentage of aggressive  
or hateful comments
21% 3% 4%
Percentage of which  
are male
70% 50% 46%
Percentage of which  
are female
30% 50% 56%
As Figure 5 also indicates, the proportion of these comments 
identified as aggressive or hateful remained consistent throughout 
the research period.
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Figure 5. The proportion of aggressive or hateful comments detected 
over a six-month period (using the classification method), with aggressive
or hateful comments in black
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Where were such aggressive or hateful comments then found 
in these three groups? A network visualisation in Figure 6 shows 
that there were no distinct patterns, with the exception that they 
were found predominantly in the Rajat Kiinni group. The cluster 
on the left represents the Rasmus group, and the cluster on the right 
represents the Rajat Kiinni group. This holds true for both before 
and after the anti-refugee/anti-immigration, and anti-racist groups 
were bridged by the discussion group in-between. The comments 
that were labelled aggressive or hateful (by the classification method) 
are coloured in black.
Figure 6. The weekly network evolution of the three groups
in February 2016 with aggressive or hateful comments in black
One interesting finding of the research was the time of day such 
comments were made. Figure 7 shows that during the evenings, there 
was a significant increase in the proportion of comments identified as 
aggressive or hateful. Moreover, there also seemed to be a discernible 
spike in these comments late on Friday nights and into the early hours 
of Saturday mornings.
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Figure 7. The relative percentage of types of comment according
to time of day (identified by the topic modelling approach)
These findings fit with other research on antisocial behaviour 
online, which has argued that such behaviour is usually informed 
by two factors: an individual’s pre-existing mood, and the discus-
sion context in which he/she is writing (see Cheng et al. 2017). One 
plausible explanation behind these patterns is that members of 
the Rajat Kiinni group who wrote hateful comments later in the 
evenings were more likely to be intoxicated, and thus predisposed 
to react aggressively to what they read online. This is also con-
firmed by a more qualitative observation of the Facebook profiles 
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of Rajat Kiinni members who were the most prolific in writing such 
comments. They consisted mostly of middle-aged white men whose 
Facebook profiles combined everyday Facebook activity with the 
sharing of nationalistic and anti-immigrant memes. Conversely, the 
discussion context in which these comments were made – a Facebook 
group where such behaviour is widely accepted and applauded – 
also provided a fertile ground for this aggressive or hateful style 
of communication to proliferate.
When combined with a more ethnographic exploration of 
these conversations, one conclusion can be drawn from the dataset. 
This is that during moments such as late at night or early on Saturday 
morning, information read online can trigger a strong response 
(see Dean 2010). There is a kind of vicious cycle involved whereby 
individuals who are already predisposed to react aggressively also seek 
out information that confirms this reaction. Furthermore, when peers 
in the group widely encourage the use of offensive language, it 
gradually becomes the new ‘normal’ – a kind of ritualised opposition 
to mainstream norms and language that is commonly found in groups 
associated with the extreme right (See Udupa 2017; Hervik 2019).
3.3 HATEFUL SPEECH AND EXTREME  
RIGHT DISINFORMATION
If information read online can trigger such a strong response, how 
then did different types of information shared in these three groups 
relate to the prevalence of such hateful conversations? And, in 
particular, how did news shared from extreme right news sources 
relate to conversations found in the anti-refugee/anti-immigrant 
Rajat Kiinni group? Table 3 shows that members of the Rajat Kiinni 
group overwhelmingly shared more URLs classified as ‘alternative 
(extreme right)’. On the other hand, the Rasmus group shared more 
information from URLs classified as ‘news (mainstream)’. The 
Asiallista Keskustelua group was positioned between these groups 
with a more hybrid media ecology consisting of both mainstream 
and alternative information sources. What was also noteworthy about 
the types of URL shared was that this reverse relationship applied 
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only to news sources classified as alternative (extreme right)/news 
(mainstream). Other categories such as tabloid, entertainment, blog, 
or social media were distributed more evenly across the three ideologi-
cally opposed groups.
Table 3. Different information sources shared in the groups
RAJAT KIINNI ASIALLISTA 
KESKUSTELUA
RASMUS
News (mainstream) 36% 50% 58%
Alternative (far right) 26% 13% 2%
Tabloid 24% 25% 20%
Entertainment 8% 7% 9%
Blog 5% 4% 6%
Social media 2% 2% 4%
The same pattern also held across the three most popular online 
news sources shared: a mainstream Finnish Broadcasting Company 
(Yle), a popular tabloid (Iltalehti), and an alternative right news source 
(MV-lehti). Table 4 shows indeed how one of the most popular news 
sources in the Rajat Kiinni group was MV-lehti, a controversial online 
news site with close ties to the extreme right, whereas it was not 
shared at all by the anti-racist Rasmus group.10
10 The most visible example of an extreme right website was MV-lehti. 
Originally, a magazine called Mitä Vittua? (What the Fuck?), this website 
became controversial during the refugee crisis for publishing stories 
with an anti-immigrant/refugee slant and personally attacking people 
supporting refugees. It is also known to have open ties to the Finnish 
Resistance Movement, a neo-Nazi organisation in Finland. As a result 
of the activities of MV-lehti, the police received dozens of criminal 
complaints against the website, including accusations of aggravated 
slander, hate speech, and copyright infringement. An arrest warrant 
was issued against its founder who had moved its operations to Spain. 
He is now awaiting trial in Finland. See jacobinmag.com/2017/04/
true-finns-finland-timo-soini-nationalists-far-right-xenophobia-elections. 
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Table 4. The percentage of the three biggest news sources shared
in the three groups
RAJAT KIINNI ASIALLISTA 
KESKUSTELUA
RASMUS
Yle (mainstream) 11% 18% 11%
MV-lehti (extreme right) 9% 3% 0.02%
Iltalehti (tabloid) 11% 7% 9%
A more detailed analysis of all the information shared 
in the Rajat Kiinni group also reveals how influential this 
alternative/extreme right information ecology online was among 
the anti-refugee/anti-immigration groups in Finland during the 
refugee crisis. Table 5 shows the root domains that were shared 
over 500 times in the Rajat Kiinni group. Six of these were linked 
with the alternative/extreme right news ecology or had sympa-
thies towards it.
Table 5. The top domains that were shared more than 500 times
in the Rajat Kiinni group
URL TIMES SHARED DESCRIPTION
iltalehti.fi 6,240 Tabloid
mvlehti.net 5,504 Alternative/extreme  
right (news)
yle.fi 5,260 Mainstream news
mtv.fi 3,413 Television channel
verkkouutiset.fi 1,804 News (linked to the National 
Coalition Party)
hs.fi 1,663 Mainstream news
35 HORIZONS OF HATE
URL TIMES SHARED DESCRIPTION
riippumatonmedia.com 1,325 Alternative/extreme  
right (news)
uusisuomi.fi 1,281 Mainstream news
paavotajukangas.com 1,274 Alternative/extreme  
right (blogger)
facebook.com 1,165 Social media
finnleaks.net 1,062 Alternative/extreme  
right (news)
helsinginuutiset.fi 1,034 Local news
uberuutiset.fi 858 Alternative/extreme  
right (news)
suomenuutiset.fi 683 News (linked to the True Finns 
political party)
express.co.uk 623 British tabloid
youtube.com 569 Social media/video
anarkisti.vuodatus.net 522 Alternative/extreme  
right (blogger)
How did these news sources then relate to the comments that 
were classified as aggressive or hateful? Contrary to what the research 
had expected, there was no simple discernible relationship between 
the information shared and the prevalence of such comments. 
As Figures 8 and 9 indicate, the comments were evenly distributed 
across all types of news source shared.
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Figure 8. The types of news source shared and their relationship
to aggressive or hateful statements in the Rajat Kiinni group
(classification method)
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Figure 9. The three most popular news sources and their
relationship to aggressive or hateful statements in the Rajat
Kiinni group (classification method)
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However, the data also suggests that where the extreme right 
information sources differed from other news sources was in the 
intensity of the conversations they provoked. Posts classified as 
aggressive or hateful, and which also shared content from the 
extreme right MV-lehti, seemed to incite more spikes in the num-
ber of comments and likes.
This also fits with the previous finding that the style of com-
munication in the Rajat Kiinni group can be partially explained 
as a strong reaction to the information read online. As Figure 10 
further illustrates, members of the Rajat Kiinni group who shared 
alternative extreme right news sources such as MV-lehti, and who 
also wrote aggressive or hateful comments in response to this, again 
did so proportionally more late at night and in the early hours 
of the morning.
Figure 10. The relative percentage of aggressive or hateful
comments according to time of day from the three most popular
news sources (using the classification method)
Hate iltalehti.fi yle.fimvlehti.net
23
:0
0
22
:0
0
21
:0
0
20
:0
0
19
:0
0
18
:0
0
17
:0
0
16
:0
0
15
:0
0
14
:0
0
13
:0
0
12
:0
0
11
:0
0
10
:0
0
09
:0
0
08
:0
0
07
:0
0
06
:0
0
05
:0
0
04
:0
0
03
:0
0
02
:0
0
01
:0
0
00
:0
0
Other
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
23
:0
0
22
:0
0
21
:0
0
20
:0
0
19
:0
0
18
:0
0
17
:0
0
16
:0
0
15
:0
0
14
:0
0
13
:0
0
12
:0
0
11
:0
0
10
:0
0
09
:0
0
08
:0
0
07
:0
0
06
:0
0
05
:0
0
04
:0
0
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
03
:0
0
02
:0
0
01
:0
0
00
:0
0
Time of day
Time of day
39 HORIZONS OF HATE
Finally, even if there was no clear relationship between the type 
of information source and the prevalence of aggressive or hateful 
comments, there were, nonetheless, clear differences in the kinds 
of comment that were made in response to the type of content shared. 
A qualitative examination of the conversations in the Rajat Kiinni 
group shows how comments on information shared from extreme 
right news sites (such as MV-lehti) were predominantly targeted 
at the content that was shared. On the contrary, members who 
responded aggressively to news shared from mainstream news sites 
(such as Yle) were responding to how they believed the mainstream 
news was misrepresenting the issue. A comparison of two popular 
articles demonstrates this distinction.
On 20 January 2016, MV-lehti published an article which (falsely) 
claimed that the entrance requirements to the Finnish police 
training school were made easier so that refugees and immigrants 
would have an easier chance of getting in. This article was shared 
by a member of the Rajat Kiinni group, who prefaced the post with 
the following commentary:
There is no fucking point any more with selection criteria 
of quality, when all kinds of ‘hairy wrists’ and niggers can 
pass the queue to become police. Soon it will not matter 
whether somebody has killed a person, as long as they 
have not killed 10 persons.
This society is sick and extremely unwell!11
11 After much deliberation with colleagues, I decided to leave these 
(translated) posts and comments largely unedited even though they contain 
offensive language. I think it is important to correctly represent the texture 
and tone of the conversation as it is relevant to the argument that I am 
presenting here.
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This post was commented on 128 times. The comments indi-
cate how the aggression was directed primarily at the content 
of this article:
Of course, the entrance criteria have to be made easier; an 
imbecile’s intelligence cannot pass even elementary school. 
I wonder who came up with the idea to train retarded 
incest monkeys to become police. It is sure they will not 
be preventing Muslims rioting.
… Now we are collecting and weaponising immigrants 
to protect the government and other shit.
… What fucking sense does this have? An idiot sells his 
country to Islam? I think I will pick up my stuff and leave 
this shit country of losers if this passes?
When information was shared from the mainstream news 
source Yle, the reaction was distinctly different. Another popular 
news article was shared in the Rajat Kiinni group on 22 February. 
The article was about Soldiers of Odin, the extreme right vigilante 
group notorious in Finland in the first half of 2016. The member of 
the Rajat Kiinni group who shared this article was angry at the way 
Yle was referring to Soldiers of Odin as a ‘radical ultra-nationalist 
group’. This post received 74 comments. Unlike the case with news 
shared from MV-lehti, however, this time the comments were targeted 
not at the content of the article, but at its source – that is, how the 
mainstream media was allegedly framing the topic. The following 
comments illustrate this clearly:
This is shit propaganda by Yle, something that Kim Jong Un 
(sic!) of North Korea is jealous.
Fuck Yle is cancer.
Again the same Yle shit propaganda. Dammit! Fuck 
what a ‘suvakki’ [derogatory term for liberals] retard company.
‘Suvakki’ propaganda! Don’t become disillusioned. You 
are needed! I don’t trust the dickless and understaffed police 
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anyway. Immigrant gangs are growing and organising like 
happened in Cologne and in Berlin. Europe is drowning in shit.
The comments indicate how influential these 
alternative extreme right new sites had become in anti-refugee/
anti-immigration social media groups during the refugee crisis. 
When the members of the Rajat Kiinni group reacted aggressively 
to news shared from the extreme right MV-lehti, this was primarily 
a reaction to the content that was shared. Conversely, when the 
news was shared from mainstream news sites such as Yle, this 
reaction was targeted instead at how the mainstream media was 
discussing the issue. The results, therefore, strongly suggest that 
proliferation of the extreme right (or extreme right associated) 
news sources online cannot be understood from the perspective 
of a simplistic causal or quasi-causal effect that the content produced 
on these online news sites has on its readers. Instead, more research 
is needed to know how these alternative news sources are able to act 
as such authoritative sources of information. In this way, they provide 
a more extreme framing of the debates that finds resonance in audi-
ences who are already predisposed to react aggressively or hatefully 
towards this kind of content in the first place (see Archetti 2015a, 
2015b). This kind of radical ‘frame alignment’ through which groups 
drift away from a shared understanding has also been identified as 
one of the socio-psychological characteristics of escalating conflict. 
Therefore, antagonistic parties cease to not only communicate with 
each other but also begin to articulate critical events and issues in 
often incommensurable ways using different sources of informa-
tion to support their conflicting viewpoints (see Hall 1973; Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985; Aly 2017; see also Della Porta and Diani 2006; 
Desrosiers 2012).
3.4 HATEFUL SPEECH AND SPACES OF ENGAGEMENT
If the antagonistic groups articulate critical issues in such different 
ways, how successful then was the group set up to bridge these 
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polarised ideological echo chambers through fostering a ‘civilised 
discussion’ about immigration? The Asiallista Keskustelua Facebook 
group prefaces its purpose by saying, ‘this group has been created 
to be a space for a true encounter between people, not a venue for 
frustration’. To facilitate this kind of discussion, the group admins 
enforced a set of guidelines about what kind of conversation was 
permitted. It was forbidden, for instance, to engage in the following 
types of behaviour:
• Provoking the other discussants on purpose;
• Attacking another person (for instance, by questioning the 
intelligence of that person, or asking if they live on welfare);
• Using disrespectful terms about immigrants/refugees;
• Using hate speech (e.g. all Muslims are terrorists, 
they should be shot, raped, etc.);
• Name calling (e.g. idiot, racist, fascists, ‘suvakki’, redneck, etc.);
• Whining about what another Facebook group has said or how 
it has been moderated;
• Shouting, that is, expressing ideas using only capital letters 
and/or using numerous exclamation or questions marks;
• Constantly questioning the moderation rules of the group 
(tips for improvement should be in private messages); and
• Comparing humans to animals (e.g. parasite, monkey, etc.).
To explore the cross-group dynamics between these ideologically 
opposed groups, the research first identified the group origin of the 
members most active in the Asiallista Keskustelua Facebook group. 
Table 6 shows how almost half of all the posts and comments were 
by members from the Rajat Kiinni group. Less than a fifth of the 
posts and comments were from members of the Rasmus group, 
and around one-third of the members had not participated in 
either group before (Neither).
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Table 6. The group origin of the individuals who posted
and commented in the Asiallista Keskustelua group
RAJAT KIINNI RASMUS NEITHER
Posts 51% 19% 30%
Comments 43% 19% 38%
The research also explored how much cross-group dialogue 
took place between the members of the different factions. Similarly, 
Figure 11 shows how there was abundant cross-group dialogue 
between the members who posted (on the left) and who commented 
(on the right).
Figure 11. The group origin of the members who posted
and who commented in the Asiallista Keskustelua group
Despite active engagement, however, the research also found 
that members of the opposing groups in the Asiallista Keskustelua 
discussion group still largely framed key events and issues in antago-
nistic ways. The different responses to an article shared by a member 
of the anti-racist Rasmus group from the mainstream news site Yle on 
16 March 2016 clearly illustrate this difference. This article was about 
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the internal communications of Soldiers of Odin, which had revealed 
that the members of this vigilante group routinely shared Nazi memo-
rabilia and pictures of weapons, and maintained direct contact with the 
editors of MV-lehti. The member of the Rasmus group who shared this 
article prefaced it with the following question: ‘Do we really want these 
guys to patrol our streets?’ Some 160 comments were left in response. 
A total of 55% of these responses were from the Rajat Kiinni group, 
17% from the Rasmus group, and 28% were from members who did 
not belong to either group.
The members of the Rajat Kiinni group described Soldiers 
of Odin as a patriotic group made up of normal Finnish people 
volunteering to keep the streets safe. The comments from the 
Rajat Kiinni group also complained about a smear campaign 
that mainstream media news sites such as Yle were conducting 
against Soldiers of Odin. Some of the comments included:
But Soldiers of Odin is not a violent group. They are fathers 
and mothers as well, they go to work, and they volunteer to 
do this.
Yes! These words remind us that we have a nation we need 
to defend. Odin does not cause trouble or get provoked easily. 
They give safety to people on the streets. And what best: they 
activate by their example other to react positively when people 
are mistreated.
Every smart person can figure out that Yle has 
a witch-hunt going on. I do not comment on the Odins but 
I wish the best to the MV-lehti in its battle against a biased 
and problematic Yle.
The members of the Rasmus group, on the other hand, expressed 
the revelations about Soldiers of Odin together with ongoing debates 
on racism, and the broader rise of fascism in Europe. They also dis-
missed MV-lehti as an authoritative source of news, criticising people 
who shared content from it for lack of media literacy. Some of the 
comments included:
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If these comments represent critical viewpoints on 
immigration as a whole, I am not surprised why people 
in contemporary Finland are afraid of the rise of fascism.
In my opinion the comment ‘two parties fighting each 
other’ and ‘we cannot know which side is trustworthier’ 
fit better to other contexts rather than trying to compare 
Yle and the MV-lehti. A two-year-old Internet magazine 
and a 90 years old state organisation who employs thousands 
of people cannot be seriously compared with each other.
Why is Soldiers of Odin so childish that they avoid on 
purpose any connection to liberals? Why, if they claim 
to protect everybody, they cannot give Yle an interview? 
Why do nationalistic people in this country hate Muslims[?] 
It is futile to claim that Soldiers of Odin would not be 
anti-immigration. I am sure they are people who want to just 
protect the streets. But as an organisation the agenda is clear.
Similar antagonistic framing was also found in the exploratory 
analysis of the different words that were closely associated with key 
terms relating to the refugee crisis. For instance, words associated 
most closely with the term pakolainen (refugee) in the Rajat Kiinni 
group included words with negative connotations such as ‘parasite’, 
‘invader’, and ‘welfare refugee’. Conversely, words associated with 
this term in the Rasmus group included words with more positive 
connotations, such as forced movement of people, and the need for 
help, such as ‘departure’, ‘escape’, ‘help’, and ‘poverty’. Similarly, 
when the research looked at the words associated with the term 
rasisti (racist) in the Rajat Kiinni group, its members associated this 
term with words connoting the expression of opinions, accusation 
or stigmatisation. Meanwhile, the members of the Rasmus group asso-
ciated it with words such as ‘True Finns’ (the populist party opposed 
to refugees and immigration start), ‘porukka’ (a word meaning ‘group’, 
often used in reference to members of the Rajat Kiinni group), or 
‘maahanmuuttokriittinen’ (a person who is critical of immigration), 
stressing again the common links between racism, the extreme right, 
and anti-immigration groups.
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Furthermore, what was interesting about this exploratory 
analysis were the words related to the term vihapuhe (hate speech) 
itself. For members of the Rajat Kiinni group, this term was closely 
associated with words connoting opinions, accusations, and being 
judged. Conversely, for the Rasmus group, this term was closely 
associated with words connoting violence, xenophobia, incitement, 
discrimination, and zero tolerance. Table 7 illustrates word associa-
tions extrapolated using the word embedding method.
Table 7. Word association of the term vihapuhe (hate speech)
in the comments of the three groups (based on cosine similarity)
RAJAT KIINNI ASIALLISTA 
KESKUSTELUA
RASMUS
Vihapuhe (hate speech) Vihapuhe (hate speech) Vihapuhe (hate speech)
Rasismi (racism) Rasismi (racism) Rasismi (racism)
Rasisti (somebody 
who is racist)
Puhe (speech) Kaikenlainen 
(all kinds of)
Rasistinen (something 
that is racist)
Syrjintä (discrimination) Rasistinen (racist)
Kauhea (horrible) Rasistinen (racist) Syrjintä (discrimination)
Kohdistua (targeted 
towards something)
Puhua (to discuss) Sallia (to allow)
Mielestä (in one’s 
opinion)
Tykätä (to like) Väkivalta (violence)
Syyttää (to accuse) Turha (pointless) Muukalaisviha 
(xenophobia)
Kohtaan (against 
something)
Musta (black) Selkeästi (clearly)
Viha (hate) Väittää (to argue/claim) Sananvapaus (freedom 
of speech)
Määritellä (to define) Viha (hate) Uhkailu (threats)
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RAJAT KIINNI ASIALLISTA 
KESKUSTELUA
RASMUS
Termi (a term) Tuntua (to feel) Kiusaaminen (trolling)
Määritelmä (a definition) Yleisesti (in general) Nollatoleranssi 
(zero tolerance)
Rikos (a crime) Asenne (attitude) Täyttää (fills)
Väittää (to claim) Rasmus (The Rasmus 
group)
Puuttua (intervene)
Viharikos (hate crime) Kohdistua (targeted 
towards something)
Kiihottaminen 
(incitement)
Tuomita (to judge) Rasisti (racist) Kansaryhmä 
(group of people)
Uhkaus (a threat) Vastainen 
(against something)
Hyväksyä (accept)
Using word embedding to underline differences and biases in 
how the various social media communities frame events and issues 
is exploratory. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that even the 
fundamental concepts associated with the refugee crisis debate were 
articulated in radically different ways by members of the ideologically 
opposed groups.
Moreover, these differences were present in the language used 
to describe the terms of the debate. This difference is also confirmed 
by the more ethnographic observations of the groups. Members in 
the Rajat Kiinni group routinely articulated terms such as ‘racism’ 
and ‘hate speech’ as attempts by the mainstream and the ‘liberals’ 
to silence their opinions and hide the ‘real truth’ about the costs 
of immigration. Members of the Rasmus group, on the contrary, artic-
ulated these terms according to a more mainstream criticism of racist 
speech and the anti-immigration extreme right. The Asiallista 
Keskustelua group, in turn, held a more ambiguous position, given 
the strict rules set for conversation in the group, and the language 
that was allowed in this conversation.
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How successful, then, was the Asiallista Keskustelua group in 
creating a ‘civilised conversation’ across these ideological chasms? 
On the one hand, it was successful in initiating a dialogue between 
individuals who seldom, if ever, engaged with each other. There was 
an abundance of debate between people who, before this, lacked 
a shared space to do so. On the other hand, whether this conversation 
resulted in the emergence of a shared inter-communicative under-
standing of debates relating to refugees is unlikely. On the contrary, 
the research suggests that the differences between polarised groups 
run deeper than just a simple lack of engagement across social 
media echo chambers. These differences have, perhaps, more to 
do with the antagonistic ways in which different political factions 
in society, and the anti-immigration extreme right in particular, 
understand the contours of some of the fundamental debates in 
contemporary Europe. While the Asiallista Keskustelua group indeed 
provided a laudable experiment in creating engagement across this 
polarised debate, bridging these deeper ideological fissures will 
perhaps require more work than creating another Facebook page, 
or promoting engagement or counter-speech.
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4. DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION
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What can this exploratory analysis tell us more broadly about the 
ongoing debates on hate speech and violent online political extrem-
ism? If, as comparative research into situations of violent conflict has 
suggested, this kind of polarised style of communication is a symptom 
of some underlying conflict, how can we approach these social media 
conversations from such a critical-comparative perspective?12
Coleman (2003, 2004, 2006) has argued that such conflicts 
are always framed in different ways by their participants. This also 
includes the perspective of the researcher who hopes to understand 
it, or the policymaker who wants to change it. These frames are both 
implicit (hidden and often unconscious presuppositions about the 
object of study) as well as explicit (formal methods used to produce 
knowledge about it). Coleman (2004, pp. 202–226) further identifies 
five such ‘meta-paradigmatic frames’ through which conflicts have 
been historically imagined:
• REALISM: The first frame understands conflicts as the struggle 
between groups of people in a world where resources are scarce.
• HUMAN RELATIONS: The second frame understands conflicts 
as the outcome of destructive relationships caused by fear, 
distrust, misunderstanding, hostile interactions, and lack of 
constructive engagement between the participants involved.
• THE MEDICAL MODEL: The third frame understands conflicts 
as the outcomes of some malignant and pathological processes 
in society that, like disease, can be diagnosed and cured.
• POSTMODERNISM: The fourth frame sees such conflicts 
from the perspective of narratives though which people make 
sense of the world and interact with each other based on these 
frames of understanding.
• SYSTEMS THEORY: The final frame sees conflicts as the 
outcomes of many interacting levels in a system, where each  
 
12 For an earlier version of the argument see Pohjonen and Ahmed 2016.
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of the component parts needs to be understood in a complex 
relationship with the others.
More importantly, Coleman argues that such ‘meta-paradigmatic’ 
frames used to understand conflict also prescribe the methods that 
can be used to solve it. Hate speech from the perspective of the realist 
paradigm is the outcome of a political struggle for power through 
which antagonistic factions in society try to gain supremacy. The 
methods used to mitigate it include things such as creating legal and 
institutional frameworks to counter it, or using counter-propaganda 
to oppose it. Conversely, if seen from the perspective of the human 
relations paradigm, hate speech is the outcome of an underlying 
cycle of destructive social relationships. The solution, then, 
includes creating new ways to increase mutual understanding by 
supporting reconciliation, dialogue, interdependence, coopera-
tion, and co-existence. Alternatively, from the perspective of the 
medical paradigm, hate speech is the outcome of some underlying 
social pathology. In this case, the processes causing it would need 
to be diagnosed and treated (such as what is the frustration and 
disenfranchisement that makes some middle-aged white men 
behave aggressively on social media). From the perspective of the 
post-modern paradigm, hate speech is the outcome of the antago-
nistic frames of meaning and narratives people create to understand 
each other. In this case, the solution to it foregrounds creating new 
narratives as a way to make participants see the need for change. 
Or, finally, hate speech in social media can also be seen from the 
perspective of complex systems theory that sees it as the outcome 
of multi-layered processes that defy easy explanation. In order to 
understand such non-linear processes behind it, more research 
is, therefore, needed; research that is able to take into account the 
complex and multi-faceted processes causing it that go beyond 
a reductionist analysis of textual content: ‘one of the more commonly 
applied principles is the idea that intractable conflicts cannot be 
traced to one or two essential causes but rather should be seen as 
the result of multiple, interactive elements’ (Coleman 2004, p. 223).
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In conclusion, then, what the exploratory findings of the research 
suggest is that perhaps the most dangerous challenge facing Europe 
is not the explosion of aggressive or hateful content on social 
media, however offensive and in bad taste much of it is. Instead, 
the real challenge facing Europe is perhaps this shrinking horizon 
of understanding between opposing members of society, whereby 
even the basic concepts of the debate are not understood in mutually 
commensurable ways. What is especially disconcerting about this 
finding is that even the sources of information used to produce 
meaning about critical issues and debates are drifting apart. The 
extreme right news ecology online has been able to hijack some of 
the role previously maintained by the mainstream news, to provide 
an alternative and more extreme framing of events and themes to 
the audiences who are already predisposed to react strongly to this 
kind of information. This political polarisation is perhaps a more 
intractable problem to solve than merely removing aggressive or 
hateful comments from Facebook.
A critical-comparative analysis of social media hate speech, and 
of violent online political extremism more broadly, can, therefore, 
provide two contributions to existing research on social media hate 
speech. On the one hand, it can help us to soberly assess the dangers 
of this speech in peaceful countries such as Finland, which are still 
a long distance away from erupting into the kind of widespread ethnic 
or political mass violence that we have seen in situations of violent 
conflict in other parts of the world. But, on the other hand, stepping 
back from the ongoing debates, even temporarily, can provide the 
necessary conceptual distance needed to come up with new ideas and 
strategies that can help to prevent such violence from ever happening 
in the first place.
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